Section 2 of Moore v. Harper. Most of the cases and precedents cited are from the 17 and 18 hundreds my friend:
"2. The Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, famously proclaimed this Courtās authority to invalidate laws that violate the Federal Constitution. But Marbury did not invent the concept of judicial review. State courts had already begun to impose restraints on state legislatures, even before the Constitutional Convention, and the practice continued to mature during the founding era. James Madison extolled judicial review as one of the key virtues of a constitutional system, and the concept of judicial review was so entrenched by the time the Court decided Marbury that Chief Justice Marshall referred to it as one of societyās āfundamental principles.ā Id., at 177.. The Elections Clause does not carve out an exception to that fundamental principle. When state legislatures prescribe the rules concerning federal elections, they remain subject to the ordinary exercise of state judicial review. Pp. 11ā26.
(a) In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, this Court examined the Elections Clauseās application to a provision of the Ohio Constitution permitting the Stateās voters to reject, by popular vote, any law enacted by the Stateās General Assembly. This Court upheld the Ohio Supreme Courtās determination that the Federal Elections Clause did not preclude subjecting legislative acts under the Clause toa popular referendum, rejecting the contention that āto include the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment is repugnant to Ā§4 of Article I [the Elections Clause].ā Id., at 569. And in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, this Court considered the effect of a Governorās veto, pursuant to his authority under the Stateās Constitution, of a congressional redistricting plan. This Court held that the Governorās veto did not violate the Elections Clause, reasoning that a state legislatureās āexercise of . . . authorityā under the Elections Clause āmust be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.ā Id., at 367. The Court highlighted that the Federal Constitution contained no āprovision of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted.ā Id., at 368. This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hildebrant and Smiley in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commān, 576 U. S. 787, a case concerning the constitutionality of anArizona ballot initiative to amend the State Constitution and to vest redistricting authority in an independent commission. Significantly for present purposes, the Court embraced the core principle espoused in Hildebrant and Smiley: Whatever authority was responsible for redistricting, that entity remained subject to constraints set forth in the State Constitution. The Court dismissed the argument that the Elections Clause divests state constitutions of the power to enforce checks against the exercise of legislative power. The basic principle of these casesāreflected in Smileyās unanimous command that a state legislature may not ācreate congressional districts independently ofā requirements imposed āby the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws,ā 285 U. S., at 373ācommands continued respect. Pp. 15ā18.
(b) The precedents of this Court have long rejected the view that legislative action under the Elections Clause is purely federal in character, governed only by restraints found in the Federal Constitution. The argument to the contrary does not account for the Framersā understanding that when legislatures make laws, they are bound by the provisions of the very documents that give them life. Thus, when a state legislature carries out its federal constitutional power to prescribe rules regulating federal elections, it acts both as a lawmakingbody created and bound by its state constitution, and as the entity assigned particular authority by the Federal Constitution. Both constitutions restrain the state legislatureās exercise of power. This Courtās decision in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, in which the Court analyzed the Constitutionās similarly worded Electors Clause, is inapposite. That decision did not address any conflict between state constitutional provisions and state legislatures. Nor does Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, which involved a contested vote by a state legislature to ratify a federal constitutional amendment, help petitioners. That case concerned the power of state legislatures to ratifyamendments to the Federal Constitution. But fashioning regulations governing federal elections āunquestionably calls for the exercise oflawmaking authority.ā Arizona State Legislature, 576 U. S., at 808, n. 17. And the exercise of such authority in the context of the Elections Clause is subject to the ordinary constraints on lawmaking in the state constitution. Pp. 18ā22.
(c) Petitioners concede that at least some state constitutional provisions can restrain a state legislatureās exercise of authority under the Elections Clause, but they read Smiley and Hildebrant to differentiate between procedural and substantive constraints. But neither case drew such a distinction, and petitioners do not in any event offera defensible line between procedure and substance in this context. Pp.22ā24.
(d) Historical practice confirms that state legislatures remain Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 5 Syllabus bound by state constitutional restraints when exercising authority under the Elections Clause. Two state constitutional provisions adopted shortly after the founding expressly constrained state legislative action under the Elections Clause. See Del. Const., Art. VIII, Ā§2 (1792); Md. Const., Art. XIV (1810).
In addition, multiple state constitutions at the time of the founding regulated the āmannerā of federal elections by requiring that āelections shall be by ballot.ā See, e.g., Ga. Const., Art. IV, Ā§2.
Moreover, the Articles of Confederationāfrom which the Framers borrowedāprovided that ādelegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct.ā Art. V. Around the time the Articles were adopted, multiple States regulated the appointment of delegates, suggesting that the Framers did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action from state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Del. Const., Art. XI (1776). Pp. 24ā26."