Depends on how you define war and how you define win.
Is this a war? What does winning look like?
Fair questions.
As to a definition of War, I’ll fall back on Justice White’s definition of pornography: I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it.
And this looks a lot like a war.
What does “winning,” look like?
A very tough question for decision makers in Kiev. Zelenski repeats he wants all of Crimea and the Far East of Ukraine back. But if his army can “win” these back, will this not create a future conflict with a majority of Russian speakers in those regions?
On the edges of this war, there are tangential “wins” occurring for the US and the West.
It’s nice to have a massive market to sell our equally massive glut of natural gas to. It’s just as nice when our main competitor for those sales invades a European country, suffers a pipeline explosion (by whomever blew it up), and generally takes a sh!t in the Country Club swimming pool of Western and Central Europe.
Europeans generally don’t like Americans. But they like us a lot more than the Fascist Russians who invaded a neighbor!
The frequent juxtaposition of Ukraine’s situation and Taiwan’s position has served us well. The Chinese have been impressed with the solidarity of the world’s wealthiest countries, and is given pause to consider how it’s growth-addicted and export-driven economy could survive trade embargoes by its biggest customers, ie, the same wealthy countries allied with the U.S.
Yes, much of the Southern Hemisphere is sitting on their hands regarding Ukraine. And those countries account for a tiny fraction of the trade China has with Japan, South Korea, the US and Europe.
Prior to Russia invading Ukraine, the Taiwan threat appeared to be entirely an issue for the U.S. and Japan (and China).
Now, almost daily, someone in Europe (the Brits, the Germans, the EU leaders, NATO leaders, the Poles, the Balkan leaders, and even Zelenski himself) brings up the topic of Taiwanese security, and it’s similarities to the Ukraine War.
And there are now German and other NATO military aircraft flying from Australia and other points in the Pacific signaling cooperation with the US on the issue of Taiwan.
Another “win,” is the expansion of NATO, the largest, lengthiest military alliance in world history, made all the more relevant by Russia’s invasion.
So, I see a “win” as (1) survival of Ukrainian Independence; (2) Ukraine’s recapture of those portions most suited for re-Union; (3) the continued growth of European dependence on American oil and gas (hence, retention of the dollar as the world’s largest trade and reserve currency), (4) the continued and accelerated growth of NATO in Europe, and the deepening of all our alliances as we shift focus to the threat of the Chicoms. (5) the continued flogging of Russia’s military, which will, (6) send Russia more quickly to where it was already headed: a demographic and economic implosion to a fate of geopolitical insignificance.
And as to point (6) the Russian implosion of the next 20 years will be a modest prelude to the same fate for China, in the next 50 years.
SLAVA UKRAINI!!!