Kicking the extra point
Have to chime in on the criticism of the decision to go for an extra point rather than a field goal. I think the other criticisms are valid. This one I don't think is as clear-cut and I understand where Stoops was coming from. Even if you think he should have gone for two, a case can be made for one.
Consider:
1) Kentucky's struggles to convert near the goal line and in short yardage situations.
2) Vanderbilt's defensive success when they're deep in their own territory.
I do think "playing the odds" could have looked like either going for two in order to make it a field goal deficit, or kicking the extra point.
At that point in the game the score was 21-16. The kick made it 21-17. There was a whole quarter left. By the odds all the way around there was likely to be more scoring.
Also, I think you coach by your sense of your team's momentum. Easy to convert an extra point and expect your team to have some momentum to finish that out. Kentucky was +7 in the third quarter and had made some big plays.
If you go for two and miss it there are two problems. If Vanderbilt kicks a field goal then you've got to score a touchdown and get a two-point conversion. Given that they had 21 points through three quarters, it wouldn't be a stretch to assume they'd get three more in the fourth. And secondly, if you miss the two point conversion then it becomes a swing in momentum that blunts some of what the touchdown did, and UK has been fragile in that regard all season long.
Fair criticism on the other points, IMO, but I do think that one call wasn't bad.
One issue related to the other criticisms
There is a sense, according to some people, that one of the tendencies Mark Stoops has as a young head coach is to micromanage the operation. That is, to become more involved in the defensive play calling, alignments, adjustments, etc., as the game goes on. And to become more involved in the decisions related to the offense as well, though I'm not sure to the extent of either.
I don't know if that's true. But I know it's a sense that some have expressed to me. Some have mentioned it here on the site as their own assumption and I've heard others that have said that's their read.
That can result in good things. There's no one style of business executive, coaching personality, managerial style, etc., that succeeds. Some are more hands-on and involved in the everyday details of the operation. And within that style some succeed and look like Type A warriors that have boundless energy and attention to detail. There are some who look like they're overbearing, overconfident and have taken too much on themselves.
Then there are some who take more of a hands off approach, only putting the headset on when they really think they need to. There's Roy Williams' reluctance to use timeouts to stop a run during a game, which is partly indicative of this approach, and there's are many football equivalents, too. When this kind of coach succeeds he looks like a genius of delegating roles and personalities. When he fails he looks like a textbook example of aloofness and incompetence.
If I had to guess I'd say Stoops' tendency has been decidedly towards the "more involvement" side of the spectrum. He is still a young head coach whose personality takes over when judgment calls have to be made. I'm not passing judgment for good or for bad on this tendency, but I will say this: Sometimes when there's some chaos and confusion, re: When to call a timeout, what has to happen, etc., then the issue could be related to this in-game chain of command and the hesitation that's related to it.
On a perfect sideline any one of the coaches on the staff would have been green-lighted to call the timeout when MacGinnis was looking for word on what to do. Stoops said after the game that he was willing to take the five-yard penalty, but to me that's a difficult angle to take because the vast majority of coaches take timeouts in much more meaningless situations than that. There are instances of coaches screaming for timeouts when they're already 3rd and 12 at their own 35. When you're in scoring opportunity against a team that doesn't give up many points, and you also know that kickers are mental players, that seems like a timeout every time.
The same communication issue re: timeouts, relaying calls, etc., may be traceable to the receiver being open. And I don't know whether it was related to the 4th and 1 call near midfield before the half, but I will say this: Drew Barker was standing there and looking at the sideline deep into the play clock. It was to the point where I was wondering whether the staff had decided whether they were trying to draw them offsides, whether they wanted to take a delay of game and punt, or what. Whether or not that's true that entire situation, in my mind, ties in directly to the chain of command: How is the call made to go (assuming it was Stoops), how quickly was it made, how much does he consult "the card" (i.e. Harbaugh) in that situation, who makes that play call in that situation, at what point does a timeout become the preferred option, at what point do you abort, and more important, what coaches on the staff have Stoops' trust enough to run up to him and say, "This is not right," and lobby for the timeout anyway. Doubt that'd go over well in the short term but there should be the kind of openness that allows for that in extreme cases.
Anyways, I thought the defense played very well and there have been instances of Stoops' visibly becoming more involved and things improving. I can only give an outsiders' semi-informed speculation but I think the chain of command and the extent of Stoops' involvement in the offense, defense and in-game details has to be part of the review as they try to improve.
Have to chime in on the criticism of the decision to go for an extra point rather than a field goal. I think the other criticisms are valid. This one I don't think is as clear-cut and I understand where Stoops was coming from. Even if you think he should have gone for two, a case can be made for one.
Consider:
1) Kentucky's struggles to convert near the goal line and in short yardage situations.
2) Vanderbilt's defensive success when they're deep in their own territory.
I do think "playing the odds" could have looked like either going for two in order to make it a field goal deficit, or kicking the extra point.
At that point in the game the score was 21-16. The kick made it 21-17. There was a whole quarter left. By the odds all the way around there was likely to be more scoring.
Also, I think you coach by your sense of your team's momentum. Easy to convert an extra point and expect your team to have some momentum to finish that out. Kentucky was +7 in the third quarter and had made some big plays.
If you go for two and miss it there are two problems. If Vanderbilt kicks a field goal then you've got to score a touchdown and get a two-point conversion. Given that they had 21 points through three quarters, it wouldn't be a stretch to assume they'd get three more in the fourth. And secondly, if you miss the two point conversion then it becomes a swing in momentum that blunts some of what the touchdown did, and UK has been fragile in that regard all season long.
Fair criticism on the other points, IMO, but I do think that one call wasn't bad.
One issue related to the other criticisms
There is a sense, according to some people, that one of the tendencies Mark Stoops has as a young head coach is to micromanage the operation. That is, to become more involved in the defensive play calling, alignments, adjustments, etc., as the game goes on. And to become more involved in the decisions related to the offense as well, though I'm not sure to the extent of either.
I don't know if that's true. But I know it's a sense that some have expressed to me. Some have mentioned it here on the site as their own assumption and I've heard others that have said that's their read.
That can result in good things. There's no one style of business executive, coaching personality, managerial style, etc., that succeeds. Some are more hands-on and involved in the everyday details of the operation. And within that style some succeed and look like Type A warriors that have boundless energy and attention to detail. There are some who look like they're overbearing, overconfident and have taken too much on themselves.
Then there are some who take more of a hands off approach, only putting the headset on when they really think they need to. There's Roy Williams' reluctance to use timeouts to stop a run during a game, which is partly indicative of this approach, and there's are many football equivalents, too. When this kind of coach succeeds he looks like a genius of delegating roles and personalities. When he fails he looks like a textbook example of aloofness and incompetence.
If I had to guess I'd say Stoops' tendency has been decidedly towards the "more involvement" side of the spectrum. He is still a young head coach whose personality takes over when judgment calls have to be made. I'm not passing judgment for good or for bad on this tendency, but I will say this: Sometimes when there's some chaos and confusion, re: When to call a timeout, what has to happen, etc., then the issue could be related to this in-game chain of command and the hesitation that's related to it.
On a perfect sideline any one of the coaches on the staff would have been green-lighted to call the timeout when MacGinnis was looking for word on what to do. Stoops said after the game that he was willing to take the five-yard penalty, but to me that's a difficult angle to take because the vast majority of coaches take timeouts in much more meaningless situations than that. There are instances of coaches screaming for timeouts when they're already 3rd and 12 at their own 35. When you're in scoring opportunity against a team that doesn't give up many points, and you also know that kickers are mental players, that seems like a timeout every time.
The same communication issue re: timeouts, relaying calls, etc., may be traceable to the receiver being open. And I don't know whether it was related to the 4th and 1 call near midfield before the half, but I will say this: Drew Barker was standing there and looking at the sideline deep into the play clock. It was to the point where I was wondering whether the staff had decided whether they were trying to draw them offsides, whether they wanted to take a delay of game and punt, or what. Whether or not that's true that entire situation, in my mind, ties in directly to the chain of command: How is the call made to go (assuming it was Stoops), how quickly was it made, how much does he consult "the card" (i.e. Harbaugh) in that situation, who makes that play call in that situation, at what point does a timeout become the preferred option, at what point do you abort, and more important, what coaches on the staff have Stoops' trust enough to run up to him and say, "This is not right," and lobby for the timeout anyway. Doubt that'd go over well in the short term but there should be the kind of openness that allows for that in extreme cases.
Anyways, I thought the defense played very well and there have been instances of Stoops' visibly becoming more involved and things improving. I can only give an outsiders' semi-informed speculation but I think the chain of command and the extent of Stoops' involvement in the offense, defense and in-game details has to be part of the review as they try to improve.
