(skip to last two paragraphs if you want to get to my main question)
Back in the spring of 2017, we started seeing an abrupt shift in Cal's usual recruiting paradigm. No longer was he stacking his classes with multiple top 10 guys. Even his 2015 class - which consisted of Murray, Skal, Briscoe, Matthews, etc. - featured three players in the top 12 of the RSCI and two who were in the top 10. He was still "getting it done" from a recruiting perspective. It's hard to argue with a coach's methods when he's nabbing guys like Fox, Murray, Bam, and even Skal.
The Fox-Bam-Monk class likewise featured three players in the top 12 of the RSCI. But in the spring of 2017, we witnessed a new approach, one that likely had as much to do with Cal's numerous recruiting defeats for elite players as anything.
UK added RSCI composite ranked #10 Kevin Knox, #13 Jared Vanderbilt, #14 PJ Washington, #18 Nick Richards, #23 Quade Green, #30 SGA, and #72 Jamerl Baker. In addition, he was bringing in Hamidou Diallo from the year before, another player on the fringe top 10 of his respective class a year before.
The popular position at the time was that Calipari was "changing his recruiting methods" to bring in more multi-year players. If you were around on this message board back then, I'm sure you remember the optimistic "let's wait and see" position of Cal's vanguard of defenders. They insisted that we were going to see more guys stick around for longer durations. The days of the one-year Lexington cameo were going to shift to a path of longer retention.
Yet, within two years, only Baker, Washington, and Richards remained, and Baker was soon to transfer. Green had just transferred, and Vanderbilt and Diallo became the first freshmen under Calipari to choose to leave for the 2nd round of the draft over returning for a second year. I remember this is the precise point where Calipari lost some of the fan base, including guys like @brianpoe .
Yet, despite all of this, the Calipari "new paradigm" vanguard was collectively insisting that the system was changing for the better and that the rest of us should be "patient and give it time."
The next season saw more of the same. Keldon Johnson went for late first round money over the option of becoming an All-American as a sophomore and a potential lottery pick. If one draws a hard line at first round money, I guess we can't really fault him. Still, the optimists perked up and drew attention to the fact that UK was returning four players - IQ, Hagans, EJ, and Richards - a record for former five star players returning in the Calipari era. A "new trend" seemed possible, and BBN exhaled for the first time since the summer of 2014, when numerous elite players decided to return to Lexington.
But the "new trend" didn't last. Despite Cal's public advocacy for a possible Quickley return in the spring of 2020, and his somewhat muffled acknowledgement that Hagans and Montgomery were not quite ready for the challenges of the pros, all three players bolted, joining Nick Richards and Tyrese Maxey in another mass exodus. Yet, this one was different. Gone were the days of second tier players following the wave of elite lottery picks like John Wall and Anthony Davis out of the door. This draft was different. Tyrese Maxey was the first Wildcat selected, and didn't hear his name called until the 21st pick. This was a career low mark for Calipari draft picks going all the way back to before 2006, when Cal's last pick went #16 (Rodney Carey). UK heard two more of his players' names called before the night was over, but neither of those names included sophomores Ashton Hagans and EJ Montgomery. They, like other former Wildcats Aaron Harrison, Isaiah Briscoe, Isaac Humphries and Wenyen Gabriel (all sophomores when they likewise left UK), all chose the ambiguous direction of "draft free agency" over a return to UK for the dreaded junior year.
To exacerbate the situation, Calipari had also witnessed the defections of multiple players in recent years, players who were supposed to remain with the program and become veteran "glue guys" down the road. The names come from diverse locations all over the country (and world): Whitney, SKJ, Wynyard, Juzang, Baker, Green, and Matthews. The notion that Calipari had inserted a "new paradigm" was looking like a complete failure. The "new paradigm" recruits weren't staying at UK. Six of them had chosen to leave after their sophomore years and choose the path of not being drafted. Seven others transferred out of the program. Five others chose slots in the second round as opposed to returning for a third year at UK.
Lost in the fog of all of the departures was a resounding reality: player retention - at least at UK - and thereby the "new paradigm" projection, still appeared futile. It didn't matter if the players looked more like DeAndre Liggins and Daniel Orton than they did John Wall and Julius Randle. They were still not going to stay at UK past their sophomore years.
And this is why I devoted a new thread to this issue and this point: is the "new paradigm" even possible under Cal's philosophy?
If it's not, then what hope does our program have? If we can't get elite players, and we can't keep the second and third tier players more than two years, then what, precisely, is anyone basing their optimism on? We've had a sample size of the "new paradigm" since at least 2017, and it looks deeply flawed.
So what exactly do you optimists base your optimism on? Are you anticipating the reemergence of recruiting dominance we experienced from 2009-2015? Alternatively, do you think we'll keep more second-tier players long term? Do you think Cal will employ a third new way? What do you base these projections on?
So what, precisely, is your answer to this current predicament? I've seen many of you point to Cal's record and his prior success, but I have yet to read one post on this board that details how Cal will have success in this new paradigmatic fog of war.
Back in the spring of 2017, we started seeing an abrupt shift in Cal's usual recruiting paradigm. No longer was he stacking his classes with multiple top 10 guys. Even his 2015 class - which consisted of Murray, Skal, Briscoe, Matthews, etc. - featured three players in the top 12 of the RSCI and two who were in the top 10. He was still "getting it done" from a recruiting perspective. It's hard to argue with a coach's methods when he's nabbing guys like Fox, Murray, Bam, and even Skal.
The Fox-Bam-Monk class likewise featured three players in the top 12 of the RSCI. But in the spring of 2017, we witnessed a new approach, one that likely had as much to do with Cal's numerous recruiting defeats for elite players as anything.
UK added RSCI composite ranked #10 Kevin Knox, #13 Jared Vanderbilt, #14 PJ Washington, #18 Nick Richards, #23 Quade Green, #30 SGA, and #72 Jamerl Baker. In addition, he was bringing in Hamidou Diallo from the year before, another player on the fringe top 10 of his respective class a year before.
The popular position at the time was that Calipari was "changing his recruiting methods" to bring in more multi-year players. If you were around on this message board back then, I'm sure you remember the optimistic "let's wait and see" position of Cal's vanguard of defenders. They insisted that we were going to see more guys stick around for longer durations. The days of the one-year Lexington cameo were going to shift to a path of longer retention.
Yet, within two years, only Baker, Washington, and Richards remained, and Baker was soon to transfer. Green had just transferred, and Vanderbilt and Diallo became the first freshmen under Calipari to choose to leave for the 2nd round of the draft over returning for a second year. I remember this is the precise point where Calipari lost some of the fan base, including guys like @brianpoe .
Yet, despite all of this, the Calipari "new paradigm" vanguard was collectively insisting that the system was changing for the better and that the rest of us should be "patient and give it time."
The next season saw more of the same. Keldon Johnson went for late first round money over the option of becoming an All-American as a sophomore and a potential lottery pick. If one draws a hard line at first round money, I guess we can't really fault him. Still, the optimists perked up and drew attention to the fact that UK was returning four players - IQ, Hagans, EJ, and Richards - a record for former five star players returning in the Calipari era. A "new trend" seemed possible, and BBN exhaled for the first time since the summer of 2014, when numerous elite players decided to return to Lexington.
But the "new trend" didn't last. Despite Cal's public advocacy for a possible Quickley return in the spring of 2020, and his somewhat muffled acknowledgement that Hagans and Montgomery were not quite ready for the challenges of the pros, all three players bolted, joining Nick Richards and Tyrese Maxey in another mass exodus. Yet, this one was different. Gone were the days of second tier players following the wave of elite lottery picks like John Wall and Anthony Davis out of the door. This draft was different. Tyrese Maxey was the first Wildcat selected, and didn't hear his name called until the 21st pick. This was a career low mark for Calipari draft picks going all the way back to before 2006, when Cal's last pick went #16 (Rodney Carey). UK heard two more of his players' names called before the night was over, but neither of those names included sophomores Ashton Hagans and EJ Montgomery. They, like other former Wildcats Aaron Harrison, Isaiah Briscoe, Isaac Humphries and Wenyen Gabriel (all sophomores when they likewise left UK), all chose the ambiguous direction of "draft free agency" over a return to UK for the dreaded junior year.
To exacerbate the situation, Calipari had also witnessed the defections of multiple players in recent years, players who were supposed to remain with the program and become veteran "glue guys" down the road. The names come from diverse locations all over the country (and world): Whitney, SKJ, Wynyard, Juzang, Baker, Green, and Matthews. The notion that Calipari had inserted a "new paradigm" was looking like a complete failure. The "new paradigm" recruits weren't staying at UK. Six of them had chosen to leave after their sophomore years and choose the path of not being drafted. Seven others transferred out of the program. Five others chose slots in the second round as opposed to returning for a third year at UK.
Lost in the fog of all of the departures was a resounding reality: player retention - at least at UK - and thereby the "new paradigm" projection, still appeared futile. It didn't matter if the players looked more like DeAndre Liggins and Daniel Orton than they did John Wall and Julius Randle. They were still not going to stay at UK past their sophomore years.
And this is why I devoted a new thread to this issue and this point: is the "new paradigm" even possible under Cal's philosophy?
If it's not, then what hope does our program have? If we can't get elite players, and we can't keep the second and third tier players more than two years, then what, precisely, is anyone basing their optimism on? We've had a sample size of the "new paradigm" since at least 2017, and it looks deeply flawed.
So what exactly do you optimists base your optimism on? Are you anticipating the reemergence of recruiting dominance we experienced from 2009-2015? Alternatively, do you think we'll keep more second-tier players long term? Do you think Cal will employ a third new way? What do you base these projections on?
So what, precisely, is your answer to this current predicament? I've seen many of you point to Cal's record and his prior success, but I have yet to read one post on this board that details how Cal will have success in this new paradigmatic fog of war.
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